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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 3216: Case illustrates that rule will be enforced.
Rule 3216 can be viewed as being either benevolent or malevolent,
depending upon the action (or inaction) attributable to the plaintiff's
attorney. It is benevolent in that a motion to dismiss for want of prose-
cution does not lie until one year has passed since joinder of issue and
defendant has served a 45-day demand for a note of issue.100 If the
recipient duly complies with the demand, all neglect, including general
delay, is excused.107 On the other hand, the rule is potentially malev-
olent because a motion to dismiss will be granted if plaintiff's attorney
fails to comply with the 45-day demand and is unable to exhibit a
justifiable excuse for his delay. In this instance, a malpractice action
by his aggrieved client is foreseeable. For, although dismissal is usually
not on the merits, 08 a second action cannot be commenced if the
statute of limitations has run.0 9 Moreover, the attorney who neglects
to prosecute is subject to censure, suspension and, possibly, disbar-
ment."10
In view of the wide spectrum of conceivable consequences in-
herent in rule 3216, it has experienced a short but controversial his-
tory. As amended in 1964, it was construed to exclude the defense of
general delay."" As subsequently reenacted in 1967, there was little
doubt that general delay was included in the mandate that a motion
to dismiss be preceded by a 45-day demand. But then the rule was
attacked on the ground that it constituted an unconstitutional inter-
ference with the court's inherent power to control its own calendar.
However, this objection was rejected by the Court of Appeals in Cohn
106 CPLR 3216(b). The condition precedent to the motion is that a year must have
elapsed between joinder of issue and the return date of the motion to dismiss. Hence,
CPLR 3216 would seem to sanction a demand for a note of issue served forty-five days
before the end of the year. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 8216, commentary 16 at 926 (1970).
107 Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d 690, 308 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1969).
108 Under CPLR 3216(a) a dismissal is not on the merits unless the court orders other-
wise. For an interesting case wherein a dismissal on the merits was not afforded res
judicata effect, see Headley v. Noto, 22 N.Y.2d 1, 287 N.E.2d 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1968).
See also The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 802, 331-3 (1968).
109 CPLR 205 permits the commencement of a new action within six months of
termination despite the fact that the statute of limitations has run. However, it expressly
excepts termination due to a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prose-
cute, or a final judgment on the merits. See generally 1 WK&M 1 205.06.
110 See, e.g., In re Higgins, 27 App. Div. 2d 840, 279 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Ist Dep't 1967)
(suspension); In re Ribolow, 26 App. Div. 2d 579, 271 N.Y.S.2d 45 (2d Dep't 1966) (cen-
sure); see also 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR. 8216, commentary 6 at 918 (1970).
Il See Thomas v. Melbert Foods, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 216, 225 N.E.2d 584, 278 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1967), wherein it was held that, if the 3216 motion were based on general delay rather
than failure to file a note of issue, the defendant could circumvent the 1964 amendment
to the rule by moving to dismiss without first serving a 45-day demand for a note of
issue.
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v. Borchard Affiliations.112 Accordingly, the rule is currently left to
constitutional amendment, which is unlikely, and authoritative re-
proach.113
What the practitioner must now recognize is that rule 3216 is valid
and that it will be enforced. For example, in Navillus Inc. v. Guggino114
an action was dismissed when plaintiff's attorney failed to comply with
the 45-day demand and was unable to exhibit a justifiable excuse.
The recipient of a 45-day demand has several alternatives. He may
gamble that, notwithstanding his failure to file a note of issue, the
court will deem his excuse "justifiable." Such a result is not improb-
able since guidelines have been established to enable a court to pass
on the attorney's delay.115 But in many instances the reason profferred
will be a busy schedule, which is not considered a justifiable ground
for denying a motion to dismiss. 116 There is also the prospect that a
court will find that dismissal is too severe a remedy and impose costs
as its sanction, 117 but this option has not been widely accepted. 118
Undoubtedly, the best approach is familiarity with the exact procedure
to be followed and prompt compliance with a 45-day demand.
ARTICLE 41 - TRiAL BY JURY
CPLR 4101: Defendant entitled to jury trial in derivative action where
money damages are sought.
In Fedoryszyn v. Weiss,119 plaintiff brought a derivative suit to
recover corporate funds fraudulently misappropriated by defendant.
In response to a demand for a jury trial, plaintiff contended that, since
a derivative action was created by equity, defendant was not entitled
to a jury trial as of right.120 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, rejected this argument, reasoning that plaintiff was vindicating
the corporation's rights, and, therefore, the right to a jury trial in a
112 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1969). The Court in Cohn based
its holding on article VI, section 30 of the Constitution, stating that "[t]he language of
the Constitution leaves little room for doubt that the authority to regulate practice and
procedure in the courts lies principally with the Legislature." Id. at 247, 250 NXE.2d at
695, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
113 See, e.g., 7B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary 4 at 917 (1970).
11434 App. Div. 2d 648, 310 N.Y.S.2d 13 (2d Dep't 1970).
115 For a list of factors that a court should take into consideration when passing on
a 3216 motion to dismiss, see Sortino v. Fisher, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st
Dep't 1963).
116 See, e.g., Beermont Corp. v. Yager, 34 App. Div. 2d 589, 308 N.YS.2d 109 (3d
Dep't 1970).
117 See Schwartz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967).
118 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary 6 at 918 (1970).
119 62 Misc. 2d 889, 310 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
120 CPLR 4101. See afso N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW §§ 60 & 61 (McKinney 1943).
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